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China has  a dual-track  interest-rate system: bank deposit and lending  rates are regulated while 
money and bond rates are market-determined. The central bank also imposes an indicative target, 
which may not be binding at all times, for total credit in the banking system. We develop and cali-
brate a theoretical model to illustrate the conduct of monetary policy within the framework of dual-
track interest rates and a juxtaposition of price- and quantity-based policy instruments. We model 
the transmission of monetary policy instruments to market interest rates, which, together with the 
quantitative credit target in the banking system, ultimately are the means by which monetary policy 
affects the real economy. The model shows that market interest rates are most sensitive to changes 
in the benchmark deposit interest rates, significantly responsive to changes in the reserve require-
ments, but not particularly reactive to open market operations. These theoretical results are verified 
and supported by both linear and GARCH models using daily money and bond market data. Over-
all, the findings of this study help us to understand why the central bank conducts monetary policy 
in China the way it does, using a combination of price and quantitative instruments with differing 
degrees of potency in terms of their influence on the cost of credit.  
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Kiinan  keskuspankki  sääntelee  liikepankkien  laina-  ja  talletuskorkoja,  mutta  rahamarkkinakorot 
määräytyvät vapaasti markkinoilla. Lisäksi keskuspankki asettaa tavoitteen pankkiluottojen määräl-
le koko taloudessa. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan teoreettisen mallin avulla rahapolitiikan välit-
tymistä kuvatun kaltaisessa taloudessa. Malli osoittaa markkinakorkojen reagoivan voimakkaasti 
säänneltyjen talletuskorkojen muutoksiin samoin kuin muutoksiin liikepankkien varantovaatimuk-
sissa. Sen sijaan avomarkkinaoperaatioiden vaikutukset jäävät pieniksi. Kiinan markkinadataan pe-
rustuvan empiirisen GARCH- mallin tulokset vahvistavat nämä tulokset. Tulokset auttavat ymmär-
tämään Kiinan kaltaisen maan rahapolitiikkaa, missä keskuspankin instrumentit perustuvat sekä ra-
han hinnan että määrän säätelyyn, ja missä eri politiikkainstrumenttien tehokkuudessa on suuria 
eroja. 
 
JEL -luokitus: E52, E58, C25, C32 
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1    Introduction 
 
The conduct of Chinese monetary policy is little understood by observers of the Chinese economy. 
Unlike in the advanced market economies, where monetary policy typically has one target and one 
instrument, the monetary policy framework in China is regarded as having multiple targets and mul-
tiple instruments. However, it is unclear through which channels the instruments operate to impact 
the target variables. It is also unclear how the price- and quantity-based instruments are chosen or 
combined to influence the availability and/or cost of credit.  
The key to understanding China’s monetary policy framework is the “dual-track” interest-
rate system: on the one hand, bank deposit and lending rates are regulated by the central bank (im-
position of a deposit-rate ceiling and a lending-rate floor); on the other hand, interest rates in the 
money and bond markets are market-determined (Porter and Xu, 2009)
1
The objective of this paper is to provide a framework that allows enables a better under-
standing of the conduct of monetary policy in China under the dual-track interest-rate system and a 
juxtaposition of price-based and quantity-based policy instruments. We model the transmission of 
monetary policy instruments to market interest rates, which we take as indicators of monetary con-
ditions and the cost of credit and which, together with an indicative quantitative credit target in the 
banking system, ultimately are the means by which monetary policy affects the real economy.  
. This system is considered 
to be part of the process of transitioning from planned to market economy and is consistent with 
China’s overall approach to economic reform. At the heart of China’s gradualist approach to eco-
nomic reform is the dual-track price system: prices at the margin are allowed to be set by market 
forces, while a large segment of the demand and supply system continues to function on the basis of 
controlled prices (Qian, 1999). The controlled or regulated sector shrinks over time, and the whole 
system gradually becomes market-based. During the transition process, regulated and market prices 
interact with each other in a complex fashion: while changes in the regulated prices invariably af-
fect market prices, due to the forces of arbitrage, movements in market prices also provide useful 
information to the authorities who set the regulated prices about changes in the underlying condition 
of demand and supply. 
The existing literature on China’s monetary policy typically focuses on various weaknesses 
of the financial system and evaluates links between monetary policy and macroeconomic perform-
                                                 
1 There are still a few regulations on yields at issuance in the bond market. For example, a corporate bond cannot yield 
over 40% more than the term deposit rate at the same maturity. However, these regulations have not been binding, as 
markets have resorted to other instruments that do not fall under the regulation (Wu, 2011). Therefore, wholesale inter-
est rates are basically market-determined in the money and bond markets.  Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
the Conduct of Monetary Policy in China 
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ance (Qin et al (2005), Geiger (2006), Laurens and Maino (2007), Dickinson and Liu (2007), Fan 
and Zhang (2007), He and Pauwels (2008), Shu and Ng (2010), among others). Although many 
studies point out that regulated interest rates might hamper monetary policy transmission, few stud-
ies pay attention to how the transmission works under the dual-track system. Empirical models em-
ployed in those studies either assume that the transmission mechanism in China is the same as in 
advanced economies or simply treat it as a black box.  
However, three recent studies do pay explicit attention to the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy under regulated interest rates. Feyzioglu et al. (2009) study the behavior of Chinese 
banks under regulated interest rates and argue that interest-rate liberalization will likely result in 
higher interest rates. Porter and Xu (2009) construct a stylized model of China’s interbank market, 
based on Freixas and Rochet (2008), and argue that raising the regulated lending rate will lead to a 
rise in the interbank rate but that raising the regulated deposit rate will instead lead to a fall in the 
interbank rate, provided the deposit-rate ceiling is binding and the lending-rate floor is not binding. 
Chen et al. (2011) extend the theoretical work of Porter and Xu (2009) and show that regulated de-
posit and lending rates either have a negative impact, or have no impact, on the interbank rate. This 
result is troubling because it implies that regulated interest rates are not effective as monetary policy 
instruments in China. The result may however be due to the particular structure of the model, which 
is a partial-equilibrium model that does not take into account interactions between the banking sec-
tor and the money and bond markets.  
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model based partly on Porter and Xu (2009) and 
Chen et al. (2011) and extend their earlier analyses by taking into account money flows between the 
banking sector and bond market. Our new model shows that monetary policy instruments work rea-
sonably well in the dual-track system, in the sense that their effects on the cost of credit are predict-
able both qualitatively and empirically. We conduct a simple calibration of the theoretical model to 
compare the relative potency of various policy instruments. We then estimate two empirical models 
to test the predictions of the theoretical model.  
The theoretical model shows that raising the deposit-rate ceiling would lead to a rise in 
market rates if the deposit-rate ceiling is binding and the lending-rate floor is non-binding. Under 
this scenario, the lending-rate floor has no impact on market rates because moving the floor would 
not affect market equilibrium. Raising the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) will also lead to a rise 
in market rates, as will issuing Central Bank Bills (CBB). If both the deposit-rate ceiling and the 
lending-rate floor are binding, then raising the deposit-rate ceiling will still lead to a rise in market 
rates; however, the impact of changing the lending-rate floor is indeterminate.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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We also discuss the role of a quantitative credit target and its impact on monetary policy 
transmission. A credit target is necessary when the deposit-rate ceiling is much lower than the equi-
librium rate, although the target may not be binding, particularly when the demand for credit is 
weak. The use of a credit target also implies that most loans are made at rates above the floor. We 
conduct a simple calibration under this scenario and discover that the impact of changing the de-
posit-rate ceiling is approximately twice as large as the impact of changing the RRR, which in turn 
is much larger than the impact of changing the issuance rate for central bank bills.   
The empirical section of this study aims to test the prediction of the theoretical model and 
the calibration. To do so, we employ daily data from the interbank market, covering the period 30 
October 2004 to 15 November 2010. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical models and the calibration: changes in regulated interest rates and other policy instru-
ments have predictable effects on market interest rates. For the People’s Bank of China (PBC), set-
ting the benchmark deposit rate is the most powerful instrument for influencing market rates, and 
setting the RRR is the second in line. The relative potency of setting the benchmark deposit rate 
versus the RRR is not fixed over time but depends on the supply elasticity of deposits. However, 
setting the issuance rate for central bank bills does not have a significant impact on market rates, 
presumably due to the relatively small weight of such bills in the PBC balance sheet. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews China’s 
monetary policy framework and describes the structure of the interbank bond markets. Section 3 
derives the theoretical model and discusses several scenarios under the framework. A simple cali-
bration is conducted to compare the relative potency of various policy instruments. Section 4 dis-
cusses specifications of the empirical models and estimation strategy. Section 5 reports estimation 
results and discusses two caveats and provides an estimate of the equilibrium interest rate in China, 
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2    Institutional background 
 
2.1  The monetary policy framework in China2
 
 
According to the Law on the People’s Bank of China, “the aim of monetary policies shall be to 
maintain the stability of the currency and thereby promote economic growth.” Thus, the PBC has a 
dual mandate, similar to that of the US Federal Reserve. Even though it is not explicitly stated in the 
law, there is also an understanding that the PBC is obliged to maintain the stability of the Chinese 
financial system, in connection with its role as lender of last resort. The policy implementation 
framework has evolved since the mid-1990s, from reliance on quantity-based instruments to a mix-
ture of quantity- and price-based instruments. Although the PBC seems not to have an official defi-
nition of its policy framework, it can be described as follows: 
 
•  (Implicit) final targets: inflation, growth, and financial stability 
•  (Indicative) intermediate targets: M2, banking-system credit, and fundraising in money and 
capital markets 
•  (Implicit) operating targets: reserve money, and money- and bond-market interest rates 
•  Policy instruments: various policy interest rates (including rediscount, re-lending, banks’ 
benchmark  lending  and  deposit  rates),  reserve  requirements,  open  market  operations,  
foreign-exchange intervention, and “window guidance” 
 
In terms of frequency of policy adjustment, the reserve requirement ratio seems to be the key in-
strument. Adjustments in the benchmark deposit and lending rates of banks are less frequent but are 
perceived to be more important than RRR adjustments for signaling the strength of a policy change. 
Open market operations, including issuance of new central bank bills and notes, and the related re-
pos and reverse-repos, appear to be used for “fine-tuning” market liquidity to avoid excessive vola-
tility in market interest rates. Other policy instruments that cannot be easily observed by the public 
include foreign-exchange interventions, window guidance and administrative measures. Foreign-
exchange interventions are used by the PBC to influence the renminbi exchange  rate. Window 
guidance gives nonbinding direction to financial institutions on credit growth and sector allocation. 
Credit quotas are specifically targeted at commercial banks when loan growth is judged to be too 
                                                 
2 This section draws on He and Pauwels (2008). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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rapid. In this paper, we concentrate on major policy instruments used frequently by PBC: RRR, 
benchmark deposit and lending rates, and central bank bills.   
 
 
2.2      Dual-track interest rates and the credit target 
 
After years of reform, China has made substantial progress in liberalizing its financial markets and 
interest rates (Feyzioglu et. al (2009); PBC (2005)). Wholesale transactions among financial institu-
tions in money and bond markets have been liberalized since 1996 as well as interest rates on for-
eign-currency-denominated instruments. In retail lending and deposit markets, the deposit-rate floor 
and the lending-rate ceiling were eliminated in October 2004, except in respect of credit coopera-
tives
3
On the other hand, there is still a deposit-rate ceiling and a lending-rate floor for retail 
banking operations, albeit these may not be binding in practice. If not binding, they would not cre-
ate distortions that cause market rates to deviate from equilibrium rates. Therefore, it is important to 
consider whether the ceiling and floor are binding.  
.  
The  deposit-rate  ceiling  is  generally  considered  binding  (PBC  (2009);  Feyzioglu  et  al. 
(2009)). In Section 5, we set up a model to estimate the equilibrium real interest rate and show that 
in practice the real deposit rate has been significantly below the equilibrium rate, suggesting that the 
deposit-rate ceiling is indeed binding. One consequence of imposing a deposit-rate ceiling is low 
and often negative real returns on household deposits, which implies an implicit tax on households 
to subsidize debtors (firms and banks). The distribution of this subsidy between banks and non-bank 
borrowers is determined by the lending-rate floor, which is designed to keep the interest-rate margin 
of banks sufficiently wide to maintain the aggregate profitability of the banking system.  
Whether the lending-rate floor is binding is a more controversial issue. The data on actual 
lending rates since 2004 (when the ceiling was eliminated) indicate that the percentage of loans 
made at the floor rate fluctuated between 16% and 32% (the floor is 90% of the benchmark lending 
rate), which suggests that most loans were made at above-floor rates (Column 2, Table 1). In other 
words, the lending-rate floor has not been acutely binding in practice.     
However, the fact that the lending-rate floor is non-binding might not be driven by market 
forces. The reason is that the loan supply is in practice subject to a PBC target for aggregate credit. 
Lardy (2008) argues that the price of capital in China is far too low, resulting in excess demand for 
                                                 
3 The ceiling on lending rates for credit cooperatives remains at 2.3 times the benchmark lending rate. Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
the Conduct of Monetary Policy in China 
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bank loans and increasing use of quantitative instruments to control credit growth. However, an in-
teresting question is why banks do not charge higher prices for loans if they face excess demand for 
loans and are free to raise loan interest rates.  
To understand this issue, we need to consider an additional aspect of the Chinese banking 
sector: competition among banks. Because of the low deposit rate ceiling, competitive considera-
tions induce banks to push out loans as long as the marginal cost of loans (deposit rate plus admin-
istrative costs) is lower than the lending rate. On the demand side, firms have excess demand for 
loans because the loan rate is lower than the equilibrium rate. Thus, without a lending-rate floor, the 
loan market would be cleared at a lower lending rate and a much larger amount of loans, which 
would result in an excess of credit in the economy. To fix this distortion (excess loan demand), two 
additional regulations (distortions) are added to the loan market. The first is the lending-rate floor, 
which  limits  competition  among  banks  and  guarantees  the  profitability  (stability)  of  the  whole 
banking sector. The second is a quantitative target for credit (credit quota), which limits the total 
amount of credit in the economy. 
In contrast to the heavily regulated interest rates in the banking system, the other side of 
the dual-track system is market-determined wholesale interest rates in the interbank money and 
bond markets, which are now open to almost all domestic institutional investors. The development 
of the interbank market in China has accelerated in the past decade and has opened up an important 
new channel of transmission of monetary policy. It has also provided a rich source of market data, 
which enables researchers to study the transmission of monetary policy in China from an entirely 
new perspective.  
 
 
2.3      Interbank money and bond market 
 
As a key component of the Chinese financial market system, the interbank market is playing increa-
singly important roles in macroeconomic management, fund allocation, pricing and risk manage-
ment (Zhou, 2009). It is an over-the-counter (OTC) market and consists of a domestic money mar-
ket, a foreign exchange market and a domestic bond market (see Graph 1). The interbank market 
was originally designed as a wholesale market solely for banks and other financial institutions. In 
recent years, almost all non-financial institutions have been allowed to participate in the interbank BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2011 
 
 
  13 
market; in general, individual investors cannot participate in the market directly.
4 The interbank 
market has grown rapidly; the volume of trade in the domestic money and bond market totaled 
RMB 137 trillion in 2009, which was more than four times China’s GDP in that year. The interbank 
money market consists of the non-collateralized lending market, the repo market and the bill & 
notes market. The repo market is the most active: repo transactions accounted for 51% of total in-
terbank market trading, while non-collateralized lending and bond trading accounted for 14% and 




Table 1  Distribution of bank lending rates,% 
 




































2004Q4  23.2  24.6    29.0  9.9  10.7  2.7 
2005Q1  21.9  26.9    29.5  7.7  10.4  3.6 
2005Q2  18.7  22    25.0  15.8  14.6  4.0 
2005Q3  21.8  24.6    27.8  8.4  12.7  4.8 
2005Q4  24.3  26.5    26.8  8.3  11.4  2.7 
2006Q1  23.0  28.2    29.8  6.4  10.2  2.4 
2006Q2  24.7  26.5    30.1  6.5  9.9  2.4 
2006Q3  25.4  26.7    27.6  7.1  10.9  2.3 
2006Q4  25.8  26.6    27.9  7.3  10.6  1.7 
2007Q1  26.9  27.9    28.0  6.5  9.1  1.7 
2007Q2  16.9  29.1    27.1  6.5  9.0  1.4 
2007Q3  28.6  26.7    26.4  7.6  9.4  1.5 
2007Q4  28.1  27.7    27.2  7.3  8.5  1.3 
2008Q1  26.0  32.6  16.8  14.3  4.9  4.8  0.6 
2008Q2  20.8  30.8  16.8  15.4  6.7  8.1  1.5 
2008Q3  20.7  30.8  17.0  15.3  6.9  7.6  1.8 
2008Q4  24.1  30.7  14.5  13.8  6.3  7.8  2.7 
2009Q1  27.0  34.4  13  11.2  4.7  6.9  2.9 
2009Q2  28.2  33.2  12.6  10.9  5.1  7.1  2.9 
2009Q3  31.8  31.2  12.6  10.2  4.9  6.5  2.8 
2009Q4  31.2  30.6  11.9  10.7  5.2  7.1  3.3 
2010Q1  32.7  30.7  12.6  9.6  4.7  6.3  3.4 
2010Q2  26.8  30.5  14.4  11.7  5.7  7.3  3.5 
2010Q3  26.1  29.7  14.9  12.3  5.4  7.4  3.9 
2010Q4  27.3  30  14.2  12.1  5.3  7.7  3.6 
Note: Before 2008, figures in col. 4 included loans priced at 10% above benchmark. The quarterly data after 2008 are 
derived from monthly data using monthly loans as weights.  
Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations.  
 
                                                 
4 Some useful information on the repo market and non-collateralized lending can be found in Porter and Xu (2009) and 
Fan and Zhang (2007).  
5 Thus “interbank bond market” is now a misnomer in the sense that it is no longer bank-only market.  Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
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Interest rates (yields) in the interbank money and bond market are determined by market forces and 
thus serve as good indicators of the credit costs in the economy. However, because funds flow free-
ly between the banking system and the money and bond market, the interest rates in these markets 
are also influenced by the regulated interest rates in the banking system. We now turn to the ques-
tion of how market interest rates are affected by various monetary policy instruments.  
 
 
3    A Theoretical Model  
 
This new model is developed based on the interbank market model of Chen et al. (2011), which is 
an extended model based on Porter and Xu (2009) and Freixas and Rochet (2008). The new model 
focuses on how policy shocks are transmitted from the regulated retail rates to market-determined 
wholesale rates under the dual-track system. In contrast to the above models, we introduce fund 
flows between the regulated banking market and the non-regulated money and bond market and il-
lustrate the manner in which monetary policy shocks pass from one track to the other.  
We assume  N  independent banks in the banking system and that  N  is sufficiently large 
so that no individual bank has market power in the market. Each bank takes deposits ( ) i D  from 
households and makes loans ( ) i L  to firms in the loan market. The assets on the bank’s balance 
sheet also include required reserves held at the central bank, according to the PBC’s RRR (α ), and 
typically some excess reserves ( ) i E at the central bank. Aside from loans and reserves, each bank 
can buy central bank bills ( ) i B , on which the interest rate is set by the PBC (exogenous to each 
bank), and each bank can also invest in bonds or other financial products ( ) i NR  in the money and 
bond market. Because the market is competitive, each bank is a price taker. Therefore, a bank’s 
profit maximization function can be written as  
 
  )} , , ( {
, , , i i i i d i nr i b i r i e i l Bi Ei Di Li i E L D C D r NR r B r D r E r L r Max − − + + + + = Π α     (1) 
 
where  l r  is the lending rate,  d r  is the deposit rate,  e r  is the rate paid on excess reserves set 
by the PBC,  r r  is the interest rate paid on required reserves, and  nr r  is the market rate in the non-
regulated market.  ) , , ( i i i E L D C  is the bank’s administrative cost, which is a function of deposits, 
loans and excess reserves.  i NR  is the net position of bank i in the non-regulated market, which is 
given by BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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i i i i i i B D E L D NR − − − − = α     (2) 
 
Inserting equation (2) into equation (1), the profit maximization function for bank i can be written 
as  
 
)} , , ( ) ( {
, , , i i i i d i i i i nr i b i r i e i l Bi Ei Di Li i E L D C D r B D E L D r B r D r E r L r Max − − − − − − + + + + = Π α α    (3) 
 
First-order conditions with regard to  i L , i D , i E and  i B  are as follows: 
For  i L , 
) , , (
'
i i i L nr l E L D C r r + =          (4) 
 
where  ) , , (
'
i i i L E L D C is the first derivative of the cost function with respect to i L , i.e., the 
marginal administrative cost of loans. Thus, to maximize bank profits, the marginal benefit from 
making loans,  l r , must equal the marginal cost: the sum of the (opportunity) cost of not investing in 
the non-regulated market  nr r  and marginal administrative cost  ) , , (
'
i i i L E L D C .  
 
For  i D , 
) , , ( ) 1 (
'
i i i D d nr r E L D C r r r + = − + ⋅ α α       (5) 
Again, the left-hand side of equation (5) is the marginal benefit of deposits, which must 
equal the marginal cost of holding deposits: the sum of the interest rate paid to depositors,  d r , and 
the administrative cost of holding deposits.  
 
For  i E  and  i B ,  
) , , (
'
i i i E nr e E L D C r r + =       (6) 
 
b nr r r =       (7) 
 
Equation (7) means that the interest rates on central bank bills must be at least equal to the risk-free 
market rates (for example, the treasury-bond yield); otherwise, no bank would buy central bank 
bills. 
Because we need the cost function  ) , , ( i i i E L D C  to be strictly convex and twice conti-





) , , (
2 2 2
i E i L i D i i i E L D E L D C δ δ δ + + =        (8) Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
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where  D δ ,  L δ and  E δ  are positive constants representing various marginal costs. Substitut-
ing the cost function into equations (4), (5) and (6) and solving the first-order conditions results in 
functions for the supply of loans, the demand for deposits, and the supply of excess reserves. 
 
Loan supply function: 
L nr l
s r r L
i δ / ) ( − =         (9) 
 
Deposit demand function: 
D d nr nr r
d
i r r r r D δ α / ] ) ( [ − + − =     (10) 
 
Excess-reserve supply function: 
E nr e
s
i r r E δ / ) ( − =          (11) 
 
If the lending and deposit rates were not regulated, the loan interest rate  l r  would be determined by 




d r r L L r L
i i i δ / ) ( , ) ( − = =         (12) 
 
where  ) ( l
d r L
i  is the loan demand function, which is a function of  l r .  
 
For the deposit market, the equilibrium deposit rate is  






i r r r r D D r D δ α / ] ) ( [ , ) ( − + − = =      (13) 
 
where  ) ( d
s
i r D is the deposit supply function, which is a function of  d r . Because the interest 
rate of excess reserves is set by the central bank,  e r  is exogenous in this model.  
We now turn to the interest rate in the non-regulated market,  nr r , which is determined by 
the equilibrium in the money and bond market. From Equation (2), we see that i NR  is the net 
amount of funds that a bank invests or borrows from the outside, taking various forms such as 
treasury bonds, corporate bonds and commercial bills and notes. On the other hand, in the money 
and bond market, funds do not originate solely in the banking system; governments and firms also 
invest or borrow in the market. Therefore, to clear the non-regulated market, the following is re-
quired:  
 
   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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) , ( ) , (
1
nr l nr d
N
i
i r r T r r S NR = + ∑
=
      (14) 
 
where  ) , ( nr d r r S is the supply of funds by the non-bank sector in the non-regulated market, 
which is a function of  d r  and  nr r . Here, we assume  0 / ) , ( > ∂ ∂ nr nr d r r r S , which means that the sup-
ply of funds from the non-bank sector increases with the market rate  nr r .  ) , ( nr l r r T  is the demand 
for funds by the non-bank sector in the market, which is a function of  l r  and  nr r . Similarly, we as-
sume  0 / ) , ( < ∂ ∂ nr nr l r r r T , which means that the demand for funds by the non-bank sector decreases 
if market rate  nr r  rises. Now, we can proceed to find the competitive equilibrium in the banking 
sector and non-regulated market. 
 
Loan market:  








r r L r L
i i δ / ) ( ) (
1 1
− = =∑ ∑
= =
     (15) 
 
      ) , (
*




l r  is the equilibrium lending rate, which is a function of  nr r  and  L δ .  
 
Deposit market:  










r r r r D r D δ α / ] ) ( [ ) (
1 1
− + − = =∑ ∑
= =
    (17) 
 
) , , , (
*
D nr r d r r d r δ α =         (18) 
 
Non-regulated market: 
) , ( ) , (
1
nr l nr d
N
i
i r r T r r S NR = + ∑
=
      (19) 
 
Using the expression for  i NR  in equation (2), equation (19) can be written as  
) , ( ) , ( ] ) 1 [( ) , ( ) , ( ) (
1 1
nr l nr d
N
i
i i i i nr l nr d
N
i
i r r T r r S B E L D r r T r r S NR F − + − − − − = − + = ⋅ ∑ ∑
= =
α         (20) 
 
The equilibrium interest rate in the non-regulated market can be determined when the interest rate 
nr r clears the market.  
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Case 1  l r ,  d r  and  nr r  are all market-determined.  
 
In this case, the monetary authority does not regulate the markets. Therefore,  l r  clears the loan 
market,  d r  clears the deposit market, and  nr r  clears the non-regulated market, all by market forces.  
 
Result 1: When the lending rate l r , the deposit rate  d r  and the market rate  nr r  are all market-
determined, the lending rate and deposit rate both increase with the market rate. Raising the 
RRR increases the market rate as well as the lending and deposit rates. The impact of selling 
central bank bills is similar to that of increasing the RRR.  
 
The proof of Result 1 can be found in Appendix A. Without any interest-rate regulation in 
markets, the three markets are cleared by market forces at three equilibrium levels: 
*
d r , 
*
l r  and  nr r , 
respectively. The equilibrium deposit rate 
*
d r  increases with the market rate because the higher the 
return in the non-regulated market, the more inclined a bank is to pay depositors to attract deposits. 
Similarly, the equilibrium lending rate also increases with the market rate. This is because the 
higher the fundraising costs to the bank in the non-regulated market, the more the bank will charge 
its clients for loans.  
The market rate increases as the PBC raises the RRR, which means the higher the RRR, 
the less the funding available from the banks and the higher the demand for funding in the non-
regulated market, and thus, the higher the market rate. Similarly, issuing more central bank bills 
also reduces liquidity in the non-regulated market, causing market interest rates to rise. Thus, when 
there is no interest-rate regulation, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to market interest 
rates is not different than the situation observed in the mature market economies.  
 
 
Case 2  Regulated deposit and lending interest rates 
 
Here, we assume that the deposit-rate ceiling is binding but differentiate between the following four 
cases: the lending-rate floor is not binding, and there is no credit quota; the lending-rate floor is 
binding, and there is no credit quota; the lending-rate floor is not binding under a credit quota; the 
lending-rate floor is binding under a credit quota.  
 
   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2011 
 
 
  19 
Case 2.1  The deposit-rate ceiling is binding, but the lending-rate floor is not binding,  
  and there is no credit quota 
  
When the deposit-rate ceiling is binding,  , which implies that the deposit market is not 
cleared at 
*
d r  and that the amount of deposits is determined by the deposit supply from households. 




l r r <
),the lending rate is determined by market forces and is a market equilibrium rate, which implies 
that changing the lending-rate floor is of no consequence for the lending market (here, we assume 
that the new floor is still below the market equilibrium rate).  
 
Result 2.1:When the deposit-rate ceiling is binding and the lending-rate floor is not binding 
(no credit quota),raising the deposit-rate ceiling increases the market interest rate in the 
wholesale capital market, and changing the lending-rate floor has no impact on the market 
rate. Raising the RRR and issuing more central bank bills also increases the market interest 
rate.  
 
The proof can be found in Appendix B. In this case, because the lending-rate floor is not 
binding, changing the floor does not affect the lending rate in the loan market or the market rate in 
the wholesale capital market. Still, the lending rate that clears the loan market is the equilibrium rate 
*
l r , which increases with the market rate in the wholesale capital market  nr r . The key difference is 
on the deposit side. Because the deposit-rate ceiling is binding, the rate in the deposit market is the 
ceiling rate rather than the equilibrium rate 
*
d r .  
When the ceiling is raised by the PBC, the higher ceiling attracts funds into the banking 
sector from the non-banking sector. Therefore, in this sense, the deposit supply increases because of 
the higher deposit rate in the banking sector. On the other hand, funds flow out of the wholesale 
capital market, and the supply of funds decreases as the deposit-rate ceiling rises. The bond price 
falls, and bond returns (yields) increase in the wholesale capital market.  
When funds flow into the banking system as bank deposits, a part of the deposits must be 
held at the central bank to meet reserve requirements and are no longer available to the markets. 
Therefore, the total amount of funds available to the market decreases due to fund flows from the 
wholesale market to the banking system.  
However, additional deposits in the banking sector can be invested back into the wholesale 
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the banking sector, which leads an interest rate level in the wholesale market that is higher than that 
prior to the rise in the deposit-rate ceiling, so that monetary policy shocks can be transmitted to the 
wholesale capital market under the dual-track interest rate system.  
 
Case 2.2  Both the deposit-rate ceiling and the lending-rate floor are binding,  
  and there is no credit quota 
 








l r r > , nei-
ther the deposit nor lending markets are cleared at their market equilibrium rates (
*
l r and 
*
d r ); in-
stead, the deposit rate in the market is bound at 
b
d r , and the lending rate is bound at 
b
l r . In the de-
posit market, the deposit rate is determined by the deposit supply, and lending is determined by 
firms’ loan demand. 
 
Result 2.2: When both the deposit-rate ceiling and the lending-rate floor are binding, raising 
deposit-rate ceiling increases the market rate in the wholesale capital market , but changing 
the lending-rate floor has an indeterminate impact on the market rate. The market rate still 
increases as the RRR increases and the central bank issues more bills.  
 
The proof can be found in Appendix C. Similar to the situation in Case 2.1, the market rate 
in the wholesale capital market increases as the PBC increases the deposit-rate ceiling. The impact 
on the market rate of changing the lending-rate floor is unclear. On the one hand, a higher lending-
rate floor means lower loan demand in the banking sector, i.e.,  0 / < ∂ ∂
b
l
d r L . On the other hand, 
higher loan costs in the banking system induce firms to opt for direct financing, for example, by is-
suing more bonds in the wholesale capital market, which can raise the market rate in the wholesale 
market, i.e.,  0 / > ∂ ∂
b
l r T . Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the overall impact of chang-
ing the lending-rate floor is negative or positive.  
The policy implication for this case is as follows: the lending-rate floor itself cannot be a 
reliable monetary policy instrument when the deposit-rate ceiling is binding. In practice, the PBC 
almost always changes benchmark deposit and lending rates simultaneously, and it is difficult to 
determine which matters most. This model suggests that in this scenario what really matters for the 
market rates is a change in the deposit-rate ceiling.  
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Case 2.3  The deposit-rate ceiling is binding, and the lending-rate floor is not  
  binding under a credit quota 
 
As discussed earlier, the imposition of a credit target becomes necessary when there is excess de-
mand for credit in the economy, which in turn is the consequence of keeping the deposit rate below 
the equilibrium rate. Such a credit target basically shifts the loan supply curve to the left, from 
which there are two possible results for the lending rate. One possibility is that the supply curve be-
comes S2 (from S1 to S2 in Figure 1), and the new equilibrium rate (E2 in Figure 1) is higher than 
the floor. In this case, the lending-rate floor no longer matters, and only the credit target matters.  
 
Under the credit target, a bank’s profit-maximization function can be written as  
 
)} , , ( {
, , , i i i i d i nr i b i r i e i l Bi Ei Di Li i E L D C D r NR r B r D r E r L r Max − − + + + + = Π α      (21) 
 
i i L L t s ≤ . .  
 
where  L is the credit quota imposed by the PBC on bank  i.
6
* L L <
 Because the credit quota is 
less than the equilibrium loan level ( ), the loan supply is constrained by the loan quota; the 
lending rate is higher than the lending-rate floor (E2 in Figure 1) and is determined by loan demand 
as follows: 
 
) ( ) (
* * L f r L r L l i l
d
i = => =         (22) 
 
Result 2.3: With a kinked supply curve due to the imposition of a credit quota, if the equili-
brium rate in the loan market is above the lending-rate floor, raising the deposit-rate ceiling 
increases the market rate in the wholesale capital market; changing the lending-rate floor has 
no impact on the market rate. The market rate increases as the PBC raises the RRR and is-
sues more bills. The impact of the credit quota on the market rate is ambiguous.  
   
The proof of Result 2.3 can be found in Appendix D. In this case, because the lending-rate 
floor is not binding, it is clear that the floor does not matter for the market rate. The deposit-rate 
ceiling plays the same role as before. To the loan market, what really matters is the credit quota. 
Interestingly, the impact of the credit quota is ambiguous. Intuitively, this is because reducing the 
                                                 
6 Actually, the PBC does not have formal bank-specific credit quotas but instead has an overall credit target for the 
whole banking system. However, to meet the aggregate target, the PBC engages in window guidance to individual 
banks as necessary. Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
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credit quota not only induces a higher lending rate in the loan market but also increases the supply 
of funds from the banking sector in the non-regulated market, as the net position of banks is deter-
mined by  i i i i i i B D E L D NR − − − − = α .  
The same logic applies to the case when the PBC loosens it policy stance, as long as the 
new equilibrium rate is still higher than the floor. However, if credit loosening is of such a scale as 
to drive the equilibrium rate below the floor, then what matters is the floor rate, and the credit quota 




Case 2.4  The deposit-rate ceiling is binding, and the lending-rate floor is  
  binding under a credit quota 
 
In Case 2.4, the new lending equilibrium rate changes much less (from S1 to S2 in Figure 2), com-
pared to Case 2.3. The equilibrium rate (E2 in Figure 2) is lower than the lending-rate floor, and the 
lending floor is still binding under a credit quota. In this case, the credit quota is not sufficiently 
tight to lift the lending rate above the floor; therefore, what matters is still the lending-rate floor, 
and the credit quote has no impact on the market rate. Because the situation in Figure 2 is the same 
as that discussed in Case 2.2, we do not repeat it here.  
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A simple calibration  
 
The model scenarios discussed above are summarized in Table 2.  
The results in Table 2 are indicative of the impacts of different instruments on the market 
rate. To understand the relative sizes of the impacts, one needs to calibrate the model based on cer-
tain assumptions about of function forms. Because Case 2.3 is the most likely case in reality, we 
focus on this case for calibration.  
 
Table 2: Impact of policy shocks on market rates 
 
Policy Shocks    Deposit-rate ceiling binding 
  Case 1  Case 2.1  Case 2.2  Case 2.3  Case 2.4 






ing (no credit 
quota) 
lending-rate floor 




der credit quota 






















N.A.  No impact  Indeterminate  No impact  Indeterminate 
RRR 
 
+  +  +  +  + 
Issuance of cen-
tral bank bills 
 
+  +  +  +  + 




As we have proved for Case 2.3, the partial impacts of the deposit-rate ceiling, RRR and 
issuance of CBB on the market rate are as follows:  
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Because  the  denominators  of  the  three  partial  impacts  are  the  same, 
( nr nr E nr r T r S N r F ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ + + ∂ ∂ / / / / δ ), we need only compare the three numerators. Moreover, 
because we estimate the elasticities of market rate with respect to various policy instruments in the 
empirical analysis, we calculate the ratio of elasticities here to compare the relative potencies of 
policy instruments. To do so, we need only assume function forms for deposit supply in the banking 
sector and the supply of funds from the non-banking sector to the non-regulated market.  
We calibrate the ratio of the elasticities of the three instruments under the assumptions of Feyzioglu 




s r A D
ε ε ) (
− =          (26) 
 
where  d ε  is the price elasticity of the deposit supply and  A is a constant term. Similarly, 
the supply of funds by the non-banking sector to the non-regulated market can be written as  
 
d d d b
d nr nr
b
d r r A r r S
ε ε ε − − = ) ( ) ( ) , (          (27) 
 
The calibration results (details in Appendix E) show that the price elasticity of market rate 
with respect to deposit rate is approximately twice that with respect to the RRR during the sampling 
period. This implies that the impact of a 1% change in the deposit-rate ceiling on the market rate is 
twice as big as the impact of a 1% change in the RRR.  
The ratio of the two elasticities increases with the deposit supply elasticity in the banking 
sector. In other words, compared to the RRR, the benchmark deposit rate as a policy instrument be-
comes more important if depositors are more sensitive to changes in the deposit rate.  
On the other hand, the impact of CBB issuance on market interest rates is small compared 
to that of the benchmark deposit rate and the RRR. This is because the average size of an issue of 
CBB is quite small compared to the amount of deposits in the banking sector. As shown in Appen-
dix E, the ratio of the two elasticities depends on the relative size of deposits and issuance of CBB 
(see Equation E.9 in Appendix E).  
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4    Empirical analysis  
 
To test the results predicted by the theoretical model and calibration, we construct and estimate two 
empirical models using daily data from the money and bond markets. We estimate how market in-
terest rates (yields) react to policy shocks after controlling for other factors. To obtain reliable re-
sults, two empirical models are compared with each other: a linear model estimated by Ordinary 
Least  Square  (OLS)  method  and  a  Generalized  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).    
 
The linear model 
 
The theoretical model predicts that market rates in the wholesale capital market increase when the 
PBC increases the benchmark deposit rate or the RRR or issues more CBB if and when the deposit-
rate ceiling is binding. The lending-rate floor either has an indeterminate impact or no impact on the 
market rates, depending on whether the floor is binding. In this linear model, we test how market 
rates react to changes of the three policy instruments, controlling for IPOs, macroeconomic news 
and seasonal effects. The linear model can be written as  
 
t t t t t t t u Dummies IPO CBI NEWS CBR RRR IR Y + + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 8 , 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β β β   (28) 
 
where  t Y ∆  represents the annualized log-difference (percentage change) of interest rates 
(yields) in the wholesale capital markets and  t u  is the idiosyncratic error term, which is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with explanatory variables.  t IR ∆  denotes the log-difference of benchmark interest 
rates,  t RRR ∆  denotes the log-difference of RRR,
7
t CBR ∆  and  denotes the log-difference of the 
benchmark (one-month) central bank bill issuing rate.  
To control for shocks due to macroeconomic news, we introduce  t NEWS  to represent sur-
prises derived from the difference between data releases of macroeconomic variables and market 
consensus forecasts of such variables. Seven macroeconomic indicators are included in the model: 
real GDP growth rate, broad money (M2) growth rate, consumer price index (CPI), producer price 
index (PPI), and growth of exports, imports and retail sales.  
 
                                                 
7 The changes in RRR are measured when the changes become effective in this study. We also attempted to measure 
changes when they were announced, and it turns out that the former measurement outperforms the latter in empirical 
models (twelve significant cases vs. five significant cases), which suggests the market rates are more sensitive to RRR 
changes on effective dates. Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
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We also introduce two variables to control for market liquidity conditions: t CBI , net issues 
of central bank bills on day t, as measured by the difference between the amount of bills being is-
sued and bills maturing on that day; and  t IPO , the amount of funds frozen due to IPOs in the stock 
market on day t. Seasonal dummies are included for the end of the month and for the Chinese Lu-
nar New Year.  
We have several issues to discuss before we move on to the GARCH model. First, to re-
move possible non-stationarity in the time-series variables, all interest rate (yield) variables in the 
model are measured as the log-differences (percentage change). All variables in the log-difference 
form  passed  the  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests.  Second,  because  the  PBC  usually  changes  the 
benchmark deposit rate and benchmark lending rate simultaneously
8, it is difficult to identify the 
impacts  of  these  two  variables  using  econometric  methods
9.  Therefore,  we  concentrate  on t he 
benchmark deposit rate in the empirical analysis. Third, even though OLS estimation cannot capture 
the high volatility of interest rates (especially in the money market), the results from OLS give us a 
reliable unbiased linear estimator
10
 
. More importantly, OLS results can be used as a benchmark for 
constructing the GARCH model. 
The GARCH Model 
 
To capture high volatility and clustering attributes in high-frequency data such as interest rates in 
money markets, we construct a GARCH model to examine the impact of policy shocks on market 
rates under the dual-track system. Taking into account the “fat-tails” exhibited in interest rates in 
the  Chinese  money  market  (Porter  and  Xu,  2009 a nd  Herrero  and  Girardin,  2010),  we  follow 
Herrero and Girardin (2010) in assuming innovations in a GARCH model with a generalized-error 
distribution. A standard GARCH model can be written as  
 
t t t Y ε µ + = ∆         (29) 
 
where  t Y ∆  is the log-difference of interest rates (yields) in money and bond markets  and 
} || { 1 − ∆ = t t t F Y E µ   is  the  conditional  mean  of  t Y ∆   given  information  set  1 − t F .  The  innovation 
                                                 
8 There were only two exceptions after 2004. On 28 April 2006 and 16 September 2008, the PBC changed the bench-
mark lending rate but kept the benchmark deposit rates unchanged. 
9 Putting both rates in the same equation simultaneously would cause a severe multicollinearity problem, and the esti-
mation result would be very misleading.  
10 GARCH estimates of both mean and volatility equations and provides more efficient estimators than OLS but is more 
sensitive to distribution assumptions and specifications in both the mean and volatility equations.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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2 / 1
t t t h z = ε  and  t z  is an iid random variable with zero mean and unit variance. This implies that 
) , 0 ( ~ | 1 t t t h D F − ε ,  where  D  stands  for  the  distribution  (a  generalized-error  distribution  in  this 
model). The conditional mean  ) ( t t Y ∆ µ  is a function of other exogenous factors: 
 
















0 β β β β β β β β µ + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + =   (30) 
 
To capture the clustering-volatility attribute of interest rates, the conditional variance can 















0         (31) 
 
where the j λ terms are ARCH effects and  n γ are GARCH terms.  i ξ  measures the impact of 




As discussed above, changing the benchmark interest rates in China means changing the one-year 
deposit-rate ceiling and the one-year lending-rate floor, which implies that policy shocks are trans-
mitted from the middle of the yield curve out to the two ends of the curve. Therefore, to examine 
the transmission mechanism, we need to consider the impact at both ends of the yield curve. On the 
left hand of the yield curve (money market), we choose overnight, seven-day and one-month repo 
rates because the repo market is the most liquid money market in China
11. On the right-hand side of 
the yield curve (bond markets), we use market bond yields, ranging from one-year to ten-year from 
the interbank bond markets: one-year, two-year, five-year and ten-year treasury-bond yields; and 
financial bonds and corporate bonds (LCB and MTN) of similar maturities
12
The sample includes daily data covering 30 October 2004 to 15 November 2010. The start-
ing date was chosen because the deposit-rate floor and the lending-rate ceiling were removed by the 
PBC on 29 October 2004. In other words, the sample period is chosen so that the interest-rate re-




   
                                                 
11 The size of the repo market was three times larger than the non-collateralized lending market in 2009. 
12 The yield data are from China Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Chart 2  Reserve requirement ratio 
   
 
Data source: CEIC 
 
 
Money markets  
 
For the money markets, we chose the overnight, seven-day and one-month repo rates. As those in 
other money markets in the world, the repo rates exhibit high volatility as well as volatility cluster-
ing (Porter and Xu, 2009). Not surprisingly, we find that the overnight repo rate moves together 
with the seven-day repo rate (Chart 3, left). More interestingly, the seven-day repo rate seems more 
volatile than the overnight repo rate, which might be due to the high funding demand for IPOs in 




Chart 3  Money markets and IPOs 
     
Data source: CEIC 
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pirical results suggests that the transmission mechanism illustrated in the theoretical models is a 
sensible way to view the conduct of monetary policy in China.  
Second, in linear models, all market rates increase with the benchmark deposit rate signifi-
cantly (the first row in both Tables 5 and 6). While not all market rates increase with RRR and CBB 
issuing rates significantly in linear models, all estimated coefficients point in the right direction: 
market rates increase with RRR and CBB issuing rates (the second and third rows in Tables 5 and 
6). More importantly, the results verify the prediction from the calibration exercise: the impact of 
the benchmark deposit rate on market rates is larger than the impact of RRR in most cases. As the 
calibration  predicts,  issuing  CBBs  itself  has  no  significant  impact  on  the  market  rate  in  most 
cases
14. This might be due to the fact that the size of issues of CBBs is too small compared to the 
amount of deposits in the banking sector and IPOs in the capital market
15
Third, in GARCH models, most market rates increase with the benchmark deposit rate sig-
nificantly, and the estimated coefficients are close to those in the linear models (Tables 7 and 8). 
Market rates increase with the RRR in more cases in the GARCH models, which might be due to 
the efficiency improvement from MLE. Similar to the linear models, CBB issuing rates impact the 
market rate in half of the cases, which suggests that markets care more about policy signals via the 
CBB issuing rate than the direct impact from a liquidity change caused by CBB issuance.  
.  
Fourth, comparing the results for the money and bond markets, the impacts of changes in 
the deposit rate and RRR on money market rates are larger than those on bond market rates in both 
the linear and GARCH models: a 1% change in the benchmark deposit rate, on average, brings 
about a 0.61% change in money market rates, while the elasticity is only 0.19 in the bond market, 
on average (Table 3, row 11). Similarly, market rates react to the RRR more strongly in the money 
market, which makes sense because money-market rates are more sensitive to liquidity change. For 
the CBB issuing rate, the elasticity in both the money and bond markets is quite small, suggesting 
that the CBB issuing rate might not be an effective policy instrument for the PBC.  
 
 
   
                                                 
14 The impact is still not significant after we take into account the PBC’s repo and reverse-repo operations. 
15 Since 2004, approximately 48 IPOs have frozen funds of more than RMB one trillion, while the largest issue of CBBs 
was only RMB 210 billion. 
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Table 3  Elasticity of money and bond market rates with respect to policy instruments 
 
  Elasticity in money market  Elasticity in bond market 
Linear model 
Benchmark deposit rate  0.65  0.20 
RRR  0.51  0.16 
CBB issuing rate  0  0.08 
GARCH model 
Benchmark deposit rate  0.58  0.17 
RRR  0.33  0.15 
CBB issuing rate  0.03  0.06 
Average  
Benchmark deposit rate  0.61  0.19 
RRR  0.42  0.15 
CBB issuing rate  0.02  0.07 
  
 
Finally, Table 3 provides some useful information about the potency of various policy instruments. 
As regards money markets, both the benchmark deposit rate and the RRR have economically sig-
nificant impacts on market rates. The benchmark deposit rate is more potent than the RRR, while 
the impact of changing the CBB issuing rate is economically negligible. As regards bond markets, 
the RRR becomes almost as potent as the benchmark deposit rate, implying that market liquidity 
plays an important role in the bond markets. The CBB issuing rate plays marginal roles in bond 




Before we conclude the paper, we would like to discuss two caveats.  
 
Is the deposit-rate ceiling binding?  
 
Until now, we have assumed that the deposit-rate ceiling is binding in China in most cases. How-
ever, we have no data available to prove that this is indeed the case. Although previous discussions 
by the PBC (2009) and Feyzioglu et al. (2009) point to the validity of this assumption, there is little 
solid evidence. To address this issue, we estimate the equilibrium interest rate in China without fi-
nancial repression (because the deposit-rate ceiling is a major component of the repression) and 
compare this estimated equilibrium interest rate with the observed real interest rate. If the estimated 
rate is higher than the observed one, the deposit-rate ceiling must be binding because competition 
among banks would induce banks to drive their deposit rates toward the equilibrium interest rate if 
the ceiling were removed.        BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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To estimate the equilibrium interest rate without distortions, we need to gauge the impact 
from distortions. Following Laubach and Williams (2001), the equilibrium interest rate is deter-
mined by 
 
θ σ + + = n q r ) / 1 (           (32) 
 
where  r is the equilibrium interest rate, σ  denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion in consumption, n is the rate of population growth,  q is the rate of labor-augmenting techno-
logical change, and θ  is the rate of time preference. The first two terms can be combined as rates of 
trend growth ( g ), and therefore, we can express the equilibrium interest rate as  
 
) , ( θ g f r =          (33) 
 
In the long run, the real interest rate without financial repression is supposed to fluctuate 
around the equilibrium interest rate. Therefore, we can write the observed real interest rate under 
financial repression as 
 
) , , ( τ θ g f r =           (34) 
 
where τ is a measure of financial repression in an economy. If we can estimate the partial 
impact of financial repression, we can determine the equilibrium interest rate in an economy using 
the above equation. To do so, the key is to find a good measure of financial repression across 
economies.  Fortunately,  Abiad  et  al.  (2008)  provide  a  good  measure  of  such  an  index  for  91 
economies from 1973 to 2005
16
 
. Therefore, an empirical model can be written as  
i i i i i i u a a g a a r + + + + + = π τ θ 3 2 1 0         (35) 
 
 
where  i g  is the real GDP growth rate in economy i,  i θ  is represented by the saving rate in 
an economy to measure the time preference,  i τ  is the financial repression index (one minus the fi-
nancial reform index), and  i π  is the fixed effect for an economy. The dataset used in the regression 
                                                 
16 Index value of one means no financial repression, zero means maximum financial repression. Therefore, one minus 
the index can be considered a good measure of financial repression.  Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
the Conduct of Monetary Policy in China 
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includes 49 economies from 1973 to 2005
17
 
. The real interest-rate, real GDP and saving-rate data 
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset. The empirical model is esti-
mated by both fixed- and random-effects estimation, and the regression results are as follows. 
Table 4  Regression results for measuring the impact of financial repression 
 
  Dependent variable : real interest rate 
  Fixed effect estimation  Random effect estimation 
  Coefficients  Standard errors  Coefficients  Standard errors 
Real GDP growth  0.692**  0.087  0.700**  0.086 
Saving rate  -0.455**  0.077  -0.411**  0.070 
Financial repression 
index 
-6.180**  1.474  -6.210**  1.416 
Observations  1062    1062   
R-square   0.07    0.07   
** denotes significant at 1% level.  
 
The regression results are consistent with the theory: the real interest rate is positively re-
lated to real GDP growth and negatively related to time preference (saving rate). Financial repres-
sion has a significant negative impact on the observed real interest rate: the more financially re-
pressed the economy, the lower the real interest rate compared to the equilibrium interest rate (Ta-
ble 4).  
Using the regression results, we can then estimate the equilibrium interest rate by subtract-
ing the effects of financial repression from the observed real interest rate: the equilibrium deposit 
rate in China was estimated at 4.7% in 2005. This estimated equilibrium deposit rate is significantly 
higher than the observed real deposit rate of 1.6% in 2005, which means that the deposit-rate ceiling 





The theoretical model shows that a credit quota may change the loan supply curve and raise the 
lending rate above the floor. Because sufficient data on credit quotas are not available, we are un-
able to include credit quotas in the empirical study. Therefore, we need to be aware that a credit 
                                                 
17 Economies in Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa are not included in the data-
set because these economies had significantly higher and more volatile inflation rates during the sample period.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2011 
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quota might affect the size of the estimated coefficients due to the so-called omitted-variable prob-
lem. However, we argue that the impact of a credit quota would be limited, for the following rea-
sons: first, a credit quota is usually set by the PBC at the start of the year and is not adjusted during 
the year, and the one-off impact of a credit quota change can be captured by the year-end dummy. 
Second, from our theoretical model, we see that the credit quota mainly affects the lending rate, for 
example, by changing the loan supply curve (Figure 1), and it does not affect the deposit-rate ceil-
ing directly. Third, we have included surprising news about M2 growth in our empirical model, 
which might help us partly control for shocks from a credit quota because M2 growth is highly cor-
related with the growth of credit quotas. 
 
 
6    Concluding comments 
 
In this study, we develop and calibrate a theoretical model to illustrate how monetary policy trans-
mission works under the dual-track interest-rate system in China. The model shows that market in-
terest rates are most sensitive to changes in benchmark deposit interest rates, significantly respon-
sive to changes in reserve requirements, but not particularly reactive to open market operations. 
These theoretical predictions are verified and supported by both linear and GARCH models using 
daily money and bond market data. 
The results of this study aid in understanding why the PBC conducts monetary policy in 
China the way it does: a combination of price and quantitative instruments, with various degrees of 
potency in terms of their influence on the cost of credit. They also shed light on why the central 
bank needs to retain quantitative targets on credit when the observed real interest rate is below the 
equilibrium interest rate.  
The monetary policy framework illustrated in this study might be useful for considering a 
strategy of interest-rate liberalization in China. The current strategy of interest liberalization de-
signed by the PBC is as follows: “liberalize money and bond market first, then the deposit and lend-
ing market; liberalize foreign currency rates first, then domestic currency rates; liberalize the lend-
ing rate first, then the deposit rate; liberalize long-term rates first, then short-tem rates” (PBC, 
2005). Some of these reforms have been implemented since 2004: money and bond markets are 
now largely determined by market forces, but the strategy for liberalizing interest rates in the de-
posit and lending market has been hotly debated.  
For example, should we liberalize the lending-rate floor before we remove the deposit-rate 
ceiling? Because the lending-rate floor is not binding in most cases, its elimination is not expected Dong He and Honglin Wang  Dual-track Interest Rates and  
the Conduct of Monetary Policy in China 
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to be destabilizing. However, does this mean that lifting the deposit-rate ceiling will become easier 
after the lending-rate floor is removed? The results from this study should shed some light on this 
issue.  
Under the dual-track interest-rate system, the role of the deposit-rate ceiling is like that of 
an anchor that keeps interest rates generally low in China’s formal financial sector, as the banking 
sector still dominates the Chinese credit market. As long as the regulated deposit rate is lower than 
the equilibrium interest rate, a quantitative credit target is necessary to curb excess loan demand 
from firms. On the other hand, the lending-rate floor limits competition among banks to maintain 
the profitability and stability of the whole banking system.  
If the central bank liberalizes the lending market first without lifting the deposit-rate ceil-
ing and the credit target, the credit target will probably continue to keep the lending rate above the 
floor, as we illustrated in Figure 1. However, that step would not make the next step of liberalizing 
the deposit rate any easier because credit-target operations would be under even greater pressure.  
Thus, instead of removing the lending-rate floor first, a better strategy is for the PBC is to 
gradually increase the deposit-rate ceiling toward the equilibrium, which would help relieve pres-
sure on the credit target. At the same time, the PBC should also increase the lending-rate floor in 
line with the higher deposit-rate ceilings to maintain the stability of the banking sector.
18
 
 As a re-
sult, the subsidy from depositors to debtors is gradually reduced, and the profitability of the banking 
sector remains reasonable. As interest rates attain higher levels in the banking sector, market rates 
in the wholesale capital markets will also increase, as the model shows. Therefore, the factor price 
of capital in the economy becomes less distorted, which increases the overall efficiency of the Chi-
nese economy. 
                                                 
18 However, this does not necessarily mean that the current interest margin of approximately 3% should be maintained. 
Whether this margin should be reduced is beyond the scope of this paper. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2011 
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Table 5  Linear models estimated by OLS 
 
Variables  Dependent variables  
 
  Repo_1d  Repo_7d  Repo_1m  TB_1YR  TB_2YR 
 

































































































































































































































































Observations  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574 
Adjusted R
2  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04 
 
Note: Repo_1d denotes overnight Repo rate, Repo_7d denotes 7-day Repo rate, and Repo_1m denotes 1-month Repo rate. TB_1yr, 
TB_2yr, TB-5yr and TB_10yr denote 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year treasury-bond yields, respectively. Standard errors of 
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Table 6  Linear models estimated by OLS (continued) 
 
Variables  Dependent variables  
 
  FB_1yr  FB_2yr   FB_5yr   LCB_1yr 
 




































































































































































































































































Observation  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1226 
Adjusted R
2  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.05 
 
Note: FB_1yr, FB_2yr and FB-5yr denote 1-year, 2-year and 5-year financial-bond yields, respectively. Similarly, LCB_1yr, 
LCB_2yr and LCB_5yr denote 1-year, 2-year and 5-year long-term corporate-bond yields, respectively. MTN_1yr denotes 1-year 
medium-term note yields (longer-maturity MTN yields are not available now). Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in 
brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 7  GARCH models estimated by MLE 
Variables  Dependent variables  
 



















































































































































































































































Variance equation              


































































































































































Observation  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574 
Log-likelihood   3804  2998  2366  3275  3667  4203  5261 
 
Note: Repo_1d denotes overnight Repo rate, Repo_7d denotes 7-day Repo rate, and Repo_1m denotes 1-month Repo rate. TB_1yr, 
TB_2yr, TB-5yr and TB_10yr denote 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year treasury-bond yields, respectively. Standard errors of 
estimated coefficients are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 8  GARCH models estimated by MLE (continued) 
Variables  Dependent variables  
 
Mean equation  FB_1yr  FB_2yr   FB_5yr   LCB_1yr 
 




















































































































































































































































Variance equation              


































































































































































Observation  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1574  1226 
Log-likelihood   2571  2894  3917  3275  3982  4157  5247 
Note: FB_1yr, FB_2yr and FB-5yr denote 1-year, 2-year and 5-year financial-bond yields, respectively. LCB_1yr, LCB_2yr and 
LCB_5yr denote 1-year, 2-year and 5-year long-term corporate-bond yields, respectively. MTN_1yr denotes 1-year medium-term 
note yields (longer-maturity MTN yields are not available). Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Appendix A: Proof of Result 1 
 
 
Without regulated interest rates in the deposit, lending and non-regulated markets, the loan lending 
market can be cleared at 
*










r r L r L
i i δ / ) ( ) (
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− = =∑ ∑
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     (A.1) 
) , (
*
L nr l r g r δ =        (A.2) 
 
That the equilibrium lending rate 
*
l r  is a positive function of the market rate  nr r , is proved as 
follows: 
  ) ( / ) ( () l
d
L nr l r L r r g − − = δ         (A.3) 
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d L <0.    (A.4) 
 
Similarly, the deposit market can be cleared at 
*
d r :  
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D r nr d r r f r δ α =         (A.6) 
 
The equilibrium rate 
*
d r  is also a positive function of  nr r , proved as follows: 
) ( / ] ) ( [ () d
s
D d nr nr r r D r r r r f − − + − = δ α     (A.7) 
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s D >0.    (A.8) 
 
The aggregate net position in the non-regulated market is given by 
) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ( nr l nr d
d s r r T r r S B E L D F − + − − − − = ⋅ α     (A.9) 
 
Substituting  E nr e
s
i r r E δ / ) ( − =  into equation (A.9),  ) (⋅ F  becomes 
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>0, which means that the supply of funds increases with market rate  nr r . A higher  nr r  












<0, which implies that a higher deposit rate 
could cause some leakage of the funds into banking deposits. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that at least some funds remain in the wholesale capital market, which means  nr nr d r r r S ∂ ∂ / ) , ( >0 on 

















<0 because we assume that funding demand decreases with  nr r  on the 
whole, despite some offsetting effects from a higher lending rate.  
 
 
Combining the above results,  
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Because  ) ( nr r r r − <0 , which means interest rate on required reserves is usually less than the market 
rate,  ) )( 1 ( nr r
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It is clear that  ) (
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Combining the above two equations and rearranging terms yields 






















        (A.18) 
Therefore,  B rnr ∂ ∂ / >0 Q.E.D.   
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Appendix B: Proof of Result 2.1 
 
Given that the deposit is binding and that the lending rate is not binding (no credit quota in this 
case), the aggregate net position in the wholesale capital market can be written as 
 





s r r T r r S B E r L r D F − + − − − − = ⋅ α     (B.1) 
 
Note that here the deposit function is determined solely by the supply of savings, and therefore, 
s D  
is a function solely of 
b
d r . In the capital wholesale market, the supply function  ) , ( nr
b
d r r S is also a 
function of 
b
d r , where 
b
d r  is exogenous and is determined by the central bank.  
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d r r ∂ ∂ / =0 because 
b
d r  is exogenous.  
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Therefore,  0 / > ∂ ∂ nr r F . 
Because the lending rate is not binding,  0 / = ∂ ∂
b
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Combining the above two equations, we can obtain 
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Because 















>0, we need only examine the right-hand side of the above 
equation. When the ceiling is raised by the central bank, the higher ceiling will attract funds from  
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other markets, such as the wholesale capital market, into bank savings. Therefore, 
b
d
s r D ∂ ∂ / >0 
because the deposit supply increases in response to the higher deposit-rate ceiling
1
0 / < ∂ ∂
b
d r S
. On the other 
hand, in the wholesale capital market,   because of an outflow of funds, and the supply 
of funds in the wholesale market decreases as the deposit-rate ceiling rises. Thus, 





s r S r D . 
 
What then is the relative size of the two opposite flows? When funds flow into the banking system 
and as bank deposits, some of the deposits have to be held as reserves at the PBC due to the reserve 
requirement, which is why  ) 1 ( α −  is in front of 
b
d
s r D ∂ ∂ / . On the other hand, the supply of funds in 
the wholesale market decreases more than the deposits increase in savings. Therefore, funds as a 
whole decrease as a result of flows from the wholesale market to the banking sector. Therefore, the 
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which means that the market rate in the wholesale capital market increases with the deposit-rate 
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given  α ∂ ∂ /
b
d r =0. 
Therefore,  
s





















       (B.11) 
 
Thus  α ∂ ∂ / nr r >0. 
As we proved in Appendix A, we can prove that  0 / > ∂ ∂ B rnr .  
Q.E.D. 
 
                                                 
1 Because we focus on interactions between the banking sector and the money & bond market in the short run, total 
saving in the economy is assumed to be constant in the short run.   
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Appendix C: Proof of the Result 2.2 
 
Given that both the deposit-rate ceiling and the lending-rate floor are binding, the market rate in the 
deposit market is the ceiling 
b
d r , and the market rate in the lending market is the floor 
b
l r .  
 
Therefore, the aggregate net position in the wholesale capital market can be written as 
 









s r r T r r S B E r L r D F − + − − − − = ⋅ α     (C.1) 
 
Note here that the deposit function is determined solely by the supply of savings, and therefore, 
s D  
is a function solely of  . Similarly, lending is determined solely by loan demand, which is a 
function only of 
b
l r . In the capital wholesale market, both the supply and demand functions 
) , ( nr
b
d r r S  and  ) , ( nr
b
l r r T  are functions of the deposit-rate ceiling and lending-rate floor because both 
 and 
b
l r  are exogenous and are determined by the central bank.  
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d r  is exogenous.  
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As we discussed in Appendix A,  0 / > E N δ  and  
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Therefore,  
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Therefore,  0 / > ∂ ∂ nr r F . 
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Combining the above two equations we obtain  
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     (C. 11)  
 
because  0 / < ∂ ∂
b
l
d r L , which means that loan demand decreases with the lending-rate floor, 
0 / > ∂ ∂
b
l r T  because there is more funding demand in the wholesale capital market when capital 
becomes more expensive in the loan market. In other words, when the interest rate for loans rises in 
the banking sector, firms have an incentive to issue more bonds to obtain capital.  
Therefore, it is difficult to determine the sign of 
b
l r F ∂ ∂ /  if  0 / < ∂ ∂
b
l
d r L  and  0 / > ∂ ∂
b
l r T . 







 is indeterminate.  
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Appendix D: Proof of Result 2.3 
 
Given that the loan supply is constrained by the loan quota and that the lending rate is higher than 
the lending-rate floor, the lending rate in the loan market can be written as  
 
) ( ) (
* * L f r L r L l i l
d
i = => =       (D.1) 
 
In the deposit market, the deposit-rate ceiling is still binding. In a non-regulated market,  nr r  clears 
the market according to  
 







i r L r T r r S NR = + ∑
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      (D.2) 
 
where  i i i i i i B D E L D NR − − − − = α . 
 
Then, the aggregate net position in the wholesale capital market can be written as 





s r L r T r r S B E L r D F − + − − − − = ⋅ α      (D.3) 
Note that here the loan demand is determined by loan quota L and that the lending rate in the loan 
market is also a function of the loan quota. 
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>0, as proved above.  
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Therefore, it is easy to prove that  0 / > ∂ ∂
b
d nr r r , similar to what was formulated in Appendix B.  
The lending-rate floor does not appear in  ) (⋅ F , which verifies that the lending-rate floor does not 
matter for the market rate when there is a credit quota, as long as  l r  is above the floor.  
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 can be negative 
or positive.  
 
Therefore,  L rnr ∂ ∂ /  might be negative or positive, which suggests that the impact of a credit quota 
on the market rate is ambiguous. The intuition behind this is that increasing the credit quota would 
induce a lower lending rate in the loan market, but it would also reduce the capital supply from the 
banking system in a non-regulated market because the net position of banks is determined by 
i i i i i i B D E L D NR − − − − = α .  
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Appendix E: A Simple Calibration  
 
In this simple calibration, we focus on the scenario in Figure 1 of Case 2.3, which is the most 
realistic scenario, as noted in Appendix D.  
 
From Appendices A and C, the partial impact of the deposit-rate ceiling, RRR and issues of CBB on 
the market rate are as follows:  
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 are the same, 
( nr nr E nr r T r S N r F ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ + + ∂ ∂ / / / / δ ), and we need only compare the three numerators. To do so, 
we must assume function forms for the deposit supply in the banking sector and the fund supply 
from the non-banking sector in a non-regulated market. Following Feyzioglu et al. (2009), the 
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where  d ε  is the price elasticity of the deposit supply and  A is a constant term. Similarly, the fund 
supply in the non-banking sector can be written as  
 
d d d b
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b
d r r A r r S
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Now we compare the relative sizes of impact of the three instruments. 
 
The nominator of 
b
d nr r r ∂ ∂ /  is  
 
1 1 ) )( ( ） ） ) ( ） ） ) 1 ( ] ) 1 [(







d d d d d b
d d nr d
b








D ε ε ε ε ε ε ε α α      (E.6) 
 
The nominator of  α ∂ ∂ / nr r  is: 
d d b
d
s r A D
ε ε ) (
− =           (E.7) 
The nominator of  B rnr ∂ ∂ /  is 1.  
 
Because we estimate elasticities between policy instruments and the market rate in the empirical 
analysis, we estimate the ratio of elasticities here to compare the relative importance of policy 
instruments, as follows:  
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where  b
d nr r r e
,  is the price elasticity between  nr r  and 
b
d r , used to measure the ratio of percent change 
in 
b
d r  to percent change in  nr r . Similarly,  α , nr r e  is the elasticity between  nr r  and α , and  B rnr e ,  is the 
elasticity between  nr r  and B . 
  
Following Feyzioglu et al. (2009), we assume  d ε =0.2 in the benchmark scenario. During the 
sampling period (October 30, 2004 to November 15, 2010), the mean of RRR is 12%, the mean of 
the deposit-rate ceiling is 2.7% and the average yield for a one-year treasury bond is 2.74%. 
Therefore, α =12%, 
b
d r =2.71% and  nr r =2.74%. The average size of deposits is about 42 trillion 
RMB during the sample period, and the average size of the central bank issuance is about 43 billion 
RMB.  
 
The calibrated results are as follows: 
 
Table 9  Calibration results 
 
 



















Scenario 1  α =12%, 
b
d r =2.71%,  nr r
=2.74%,  d ε =0.1 
α =20%,  s D =42 trillion RMB 
B=43 billion RMB 









d r =2.71%,  nr r
=2.74%,  d ε =0.2 
α =12%,  s D =42 trillion RMB 
 B=43 billion RMB 





Scenario 3  α =12%, 
b
d r =2.71%,  nr r
=2.74%,  d ε =0.3 
α =20%,  s D =70 trillion RMB 
 B=100 billion RMB 
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